The outbreak of the First World War in August 1914, ironically seemed to prevent Ireland sliding into catastrophic Civil War over the issue of Home Rule.  However, its tragic fortunes would also see Ireland transformed in the space of 4 years, with rebellion, division and a drive towards not Home Rule but an independent Republic... and Partition of Ireland.

Redmond was calling for the Irish Volunteers to form an Irish Defence Force. Few would argue with the IVF defending Ireland from German invasion. However, some found his wider support for the war surprising given the bitter feelings aroused over the recent Bachelor’s Walk incident. 

BRITISH REACTION

Asquith wrote in his diary that the one bright spot in the midst of all the dark news of War was Ireland. It seemed to some as if Nationalist and Unionist had strangely put their differences aside in a very welcome way - Could this suggest later compromise? Sadly this was not to be. 

sinn fein reaction 

Sinn Fein was a small and radical party in 1914. However, it made its views on the war very clear from the start.  This was not Ireland's war but Britain's. Its interests lay with Ireland and its future. This stance was not overly popular at the time but its steadfast opposition to the war would prove crucial after 1916 and especially during the Conscription crisis. 

A MISTAKE?

Historians have debated whether or not Redmond’s decision to support Britain in the war was a mistake.

• Roy Foster claims that the decision was a ‘disaster’ for Redmond and the IPP because it tied them to an increasingly unpopular war.
  
• However, Joe Lee believes that Redmond had no choice, since he hoped to influence any post-war settlement, especially with Ulster’s ‘special provision’ yet to be defined. 

EXPERIENCE OF BEING IRISH IN THE BRITISH ARMY:

"​The British authorities made the mistake of treating Irishmen who volunteered with open insolence and distrust. It was almost impossible for a Catholic to get a commission: the National (mainly Catholic)University was not allowed to have a training corps for officers, although Trinity College (mainly Protestants) had its OTC. The presentation of colours to Irish regiments was discouraged and they were permitted to march only under the Union Jack; the wearing of Irish badges was not allowed. An offer made by some prominent nationalists to form Irish brigades under Irish officers for foreign service was refused..."    Dorothy MacArdle the Irish Republic 

Stuart Archer suggests that Kitchener regarded Irish recruits as "potential rebels".
The government were quick to see the mistakes that undermined Redmond, "dreadful mistakes and most regrettable blunders" (Asquith), "stupidities beyond belief that almost look like malignancy" (Lloyd George).
However, they did little to change Kitchener's course. Redmond later complained "our efforts were thwarted, ignored and snubbed.. Everything, almost, that we asked for was refused, and everything, almost, that we protested against was done" (John Redmond, Oct 1916).

EXPERIENCE OF THE ULSTER VOLUNTEERS

​The Ulster Volunteers, on the contrary, were privileged in every way; Sir Edward Carson insisted on their being enrolled as a separate unit with their own colours and recruiting officers. All this was conceded - and the officers they preferred - those who had been instructing them in their preparations to resist Parliament by force of arms - were released from their regiments to become officers in the new unit. Their refusal to admit Catholics to their ranks was condoned

• While Redmond’s support for the war was based on sound political principles it ultimately led to the demise of the National Volunteers as an effective force 
• Those who joined up were dispersed throughout the British army and the majority who remained in Ireland were neglected and gradually lost direction.
  
• The unpopularity of the War and Redmond’s perceived disinterest rendered the Irish Volunteers a demoralised and apathetic force.
  
• While Redmond enjoyed the overwhelming support of the Volunteers in rural Ireland, in Dublin 2,000 of the cities 6,700 Volunteers remained loyal to Eoin MacNeill.
  
• This helped the IRB conspiracy by providing them with a hardcore, compact unit which it could exploit for its own ends – the end product of course would be the Easter Rising.
  
• The Supreme Council of the IRB agreed to a rebellion strategy as early as August 1914 and by this time they had fully infiltrated MacNeill’s Volunteers and had a controlling interest in its new General Council. MacNeill (Chief of Staff) was unaware of the extent of IRB infiltration and he crucially underestimated the threat it posed.

differences within the sinn fein volunteers

There were also significant divisions within The Sinn Fein Volunteers;

• MacNeill’s position, which was shared by the majority of the group, was they should remain in a state of readiness to insist on the implementation of Home Rule at the end of the war.
  
• Whenever the issue of staging a rising was raised in the General Council MacNeill was firmly opposed - he insisted that he would only sanction the use of violence if the authorities tried to suppress the Volunteer movement
  
• However, the IRB continued in their attempts to circumvent his authority over the organisation. 

nationalist recruitment

Redmond’s support for the War didn’t necessarily translate into widespread nationalist recruitment 

• The failure to create an Irish Regiment contributed to a rapid fall in Irish recruits after the first 6 months e.g. in the first six months of the War 50,000 Irishmen enlisted but this number was halved in the following six months.
• ​Moreover, in the first year of the War over half Irish recruits came from Ulster and the majority of recruits from Dublin (unskilled labourers) were motivated by economics not politics or patriotism. 
• The War created an economic boom in rural Ireland as demand for agricultural produce increased and prices soared.
  
• Younger sons could now be employed in the more intensive farming that developed so there was no pressure for them to emigrate or join the army.
  
• The middle classes, farmers’ sons and shop assistants in market towns, therefore had little interest in enlisting and it was here that Sinn Fein began to generate support and make significant headway. 
  

POTENTIAL THREAT OF SINN FEIN TOWARDS CONSTITUTIONAL NATIONALISTS

Despite the apparent lack of progress of the Sinn Fein Volunteers John Dillon clearly recognised the potential threat the movement posed to constitutional nationalism.

The IPP was in an increasingly vulnerable position – there were TWO main reasons which contributed to their weakness:

However, these obvious weaknesses shouldn’t be over-exaggerated – between 1914 and 1916 the IPP saw off the electoral challenge mounted by radical nationalist groups and Redmond’s party enjoyed the support of the majority in nationalist Ireland. In the wartime by-elections the IPP easily won in rural areas and it was only in the urban College Green (Dublin) constituency that their weakness was exposed. J.D, Nugent (IPP candidate) defeated Thomas Farren (Irish Labour Party) by a meagre 500 votes – key to Farren’s challenge was the support of James Connolly and James Larkin, the two key members in the Irish Trade Union Congress (ITUC). In retrospect Redmond’s support for the War contributed significantly to the demise of the IPP and it was instrumental in handing the political initiative to Sinn Fein.

However, Redmond’s policy did have at least one positive benefit – the War did heal some of the divisions between Nationalists and Southern Unionists. The southern Protestant gentry enthusiastically filled the officer ranks of the 10th and 16th Irish divisions of the British Army and this brought them into close contact with grassroots Nationalist opinion. However, this was only a minor gain and it was greatly offset by the negative aspects of IPP support for the War. Historians have debated how much damage its support for the war caused the IPP. Paul Bew argues that it caused little damage and that the IPP’s support held up very well until the aftermath of the Easter Rising in 1916. However, Townshend and Maume both argue that the IPP was already running into trouble in 1915. Augistine Birrell, the Chief Secretary for Ireland, wrote that he felt the situation in Ireland was one of ‘actual menace’ by late 1915

Meanwhile, in the summer of 1916, the 36th (Ulster) Division saw their most serious action in the Battle of the Somme.

• The Ulster Division was committed in the attack on the first day, tasked with taking a German fortification called the Schwaben Redoubt.
  
• They were among the few units to reach their objective, but reinforcements despatched into the carnage of no man's land never reached them, and eventually, isolated and surrounded they were forced to retreat.
  
• Of the nine Victoria Crosses awarded on the day, three went to the Ulster Division - two of them posthumously.
  
• The Division was relieved on 2 July having suffered more than 5,000 casualties - 2,069 of whom were killed. Tattered and traumatised, the Ulster Division withdrew from the battlefield to regroup and march directly into the political mythology of Ulster Unionism. Their "blood sacrifice" was seen as Ulster's side of a deal in which Britain would somehow "see the loyal province right" in the agonising over Home Rule which was sure to resume when the fighting was done. Philip Orr says that the tragedy of the Somme provided Ulster Unionists with specifically ‘Ulster’ heroes and helped to create a sense of national identity for the North