Ireland was shaped by Conflict but also by the Treaties and legislation which resulted from Conflict. It is just as important to study the Treaties that end a war as they often sow seeds for another.  This section investigates the Government of Ireland Act 1920 and the much more contentious Anglo Irish Treaty. 

the government of ireland act 1920 

In 1920 the British Government passed the Government of Ireland Act. This act effectively partitioned Ireland into a 6 state Northern Ireland and the remaining 26 counties which it hoped would accept some form of Home Rule once the Anglo Irish war had concluded
 

While the Anglo-Irish War was going on, the government was still trying to pursue a political solution to the Irish problem.

• Outside Ireland, the result of the General Election of December 1918 was an overwhelming victory for the Coalition Government of Lloyd George, who was supported by the Conservatives and a section of the Liberals.
  
• The other part of the Liberal Party, led by Asquith, together with the Labour Party, were now in opposition.
  
• For the government the Irish question was bound to re-emerge as an important priority, not only because of Sinn Fein’s recent victory in the Irish elections, but also because the application of the 1914 Home Rule Act had only been postponed until the​ end of the war. The Irish question still begged a proper answer.

how did it happen?

reactions to government of ireland act

INITIAL NEGOTIATIONS AND AIMS

• Lloyd George and de Valera met in London four times in July 1921. Lloyd George offered Ireland ‘DOMINION STATUS’, offering de Valera the chance to “come take your place at this Commonwealth of free nations”.
• De Valera did not want to cause a split in Sinn Fein, and he knew that diluting the demand for a Republic would damage Sinn Fein unity. He knew compromise on republican status was inevitable, so tried to avoid discussions on Ireland’s relationship with Britain, focusing instead on the issue of partition and criticising the establishment of Northern Ireland.
• Lloyd George warned that an outright rejection of his proposals would end the truce. De Valera therefore returned to Dublin with Lloyd George’s promise of dominion status. The Dail discussed the proposals but were very divided. Griffith was encouraged, but Brugha thought they should hold out for a republic.
  
• De Valera wrote again to Lloyd George in August 1921 arguing that Ireland could never have true dominion status like other nations such as Canada because it was too close to Britain. Instead, he proposed Ireland should have ‘external association’ with Britain, but it was not clear what that meant.
  
• Lloyd George suggested another conference to try to get a deal:

The Dail accepted and arranged for a delegation to go to London.
It was clear that in accepting this offer, Sinn Fein were also accepting that a republic was not on offer.

DE VALERA OPTS OUT OF TREATY NEGOTIATIONS

• Crucially, de Valera announced that he would not personally attend the conference.
• Collins was furious – he believed that de Valera was abdicating his responsibilities.
• De Valera argued that as ‘President of the Republic’ his position as ‘head of state’ should not be compromised ‘by any arrangements’ which the Irish delegation might have to agree to in London. 
• The delegation was led by Arthur Griffith. Michael Collins was a reluctant participant. He argued that he was a soldier and it was ‘not his place’. De Valera assumed that Griffiths and Collins would be prepared to make concession on Ireland’s status, so he also sent Robert Barton and Erskine Childers as a balance. He knew that Childers, in particular, would be opposed to the idea of accepting dominion status. However, Childers was the delegation secretary and did not have a vote.
  

interpretations on de valera's non participation

• Dr. Russell Rees says that “it is hard to escape the conclusion that de Valera would not go because he knew that a significant compromise on Ireland’s status was inevitable, and he did not want to personally associated with such a compromise”.

• Tim Pat Coogan has stressed that by sitting on the sidelines and insisting on Collins’ participation at the conference, de Valera was taking a decisive advantage over Collins in his rivalry for the leadership. Coogan says that “Collins was a scapegoat in a failed republican strategy which ignored the vehement opposition of Northern Protestants to the concept of a united Ireland”.
  
• On the other hand, it could be argued that de Valera simply realised that, given Collins’ standing in the IRA, any settlement approved by Collins would have a greater chance of being accepted in Ireland.

THE NEGOTIATIONS

• ​The prospect of the resumption of the war was kept firmly before the Irish delegation.
  
• Lloyd George was determined that the issue of Ulster would not be allowed to be the cause of a breakdown in negotiations as he knew the British public would not support a return to war to maintain the existing border. He knew the Ulster Unionists would never move on this and he also needed to keep the Conservative members of his coalition government on board. The coercion of Ulster was never an option and this left Lloyd George with little room for manoeuvre on the partition question.

• The negotiations began with the Irish delegation being presented with the proposal for dominion status, which had previously been rejected by de Valera.
  
• In the meetings that followed, Griffiths and Collins tried to put the focus on the question of Ulster, focusing on the plight of northern Catholics.
  
• The freedom of the Irish delegation to make decision was constantly undermined by letters from de Valera, which Collins and Griffith saw as interference.
  
• Lloyd George also gained a tactical advantage by getting the Irish delegation to agree to a series of sub-conferences, where the Irish representatives were broken into smaller groups – this was a ‘divide and conquer’ tactic but was also welcomed by Collins and Griffith (to be rid of Childer's influence who they saw as a spy for De Valera.)

• As the conference progressed he made it clear that failure to agree would lead to a resumption of the war.
• With great sincerity, Lloyd George produced two letters addressed to James Craig: One that declared peace and a second that declared the resumption of "immediate and terrible war". He warned that those who were not for peace “must take full responsibility for the war that would immediately follow”. Many contemporaries regarded this threat as a bluff.

• The treaty that was finally signed on 6th December 1921 offered Ireland the same dominion status as Canada – it would become the Irish Free State.
  
• It obliged Irish MPs to swear an oath of allegiance to the British Crown, allowed Britain to retain three ‘treaty ports’, and allowed Northern Ireland to opt out of the Irish Free State.
  
• The Anglo-Irish Treaty also stated that a Boundary Commission would be set up to review the boundary between Northern Ireland and the Irish Free State. Northern Ireland was technically defined as part of the Free State but with the right to opt out - which it immediately did.
  
• According to Archer, the Irish agreed to sacrifice on "status" and agreed to the Oath in return for the promise of "essential unity" offered by the Boundary Commission.

THE KEY TERMS OF THE TREATY

• The treaty split the Dail. Cathal Brugha sided with de Valera. Arthur Griffith sided with Collins. De Valera resigned as President and was replaced by Arthur Griffith.
  
• The Dail, after a series of passionate debates, voted in favour of the treaty by a narrow majority of 64 to 57 in January 1922.
  
• There was little real enthusiasm among nationalists for the treaty, though most accepted that it was the best that could be achieved.
  
• The terms of the Treaty were carried out almost immediately. A new Provisional Government was appointed under Michael Collins.
  
• The British Army then began the process of withdrawing from Ireland.
  
• In June 1922 a General Election was held in Ireland, and the pro-Treaty group achieved a convincing majority.
  
• The anti-Treaty faction, led by de Valera, refused to accept the verdict and a civil war followed. It was more brutal and destructive than the Anglo-Irish War. Peter Neville says that “de Valera’s unwillingness to compromise” led to the civil war.